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Primary Enforcement Responsibility for Pesticide
Use Violations Under the Federal Pesticide Act of
1978
The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978 (1978 Act)1 is designed to facilitate implementation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).2 It accomplishes this in part by clarifying
and delineating the regulatory powers given the Environmental Protection Agency by FIFRA.3 Among the significant clarifications is
the express delegation to the states of responsibility for regulating
pesticide use.' Previously, the responsibility had not been clearly
assigned to either the states or the EPA; this resulted in duplication
of enforcement programs by the states and the EPA, which in turn
engendered a dispute as to which mode of enforcement best implemented the provisions and intent of FIFRA. By resolving the dispute in favor of the state enforcement programs, the 1978 Act attempts to end such inefficient duplication and achieve enforcement
responsive to both local and federal needs.
Nonetheless, Congress has not stripped the EPA of all power to
enforce laws regulating pesticide use. The 1978 Act gives the EPA
the responsibility to evaluate whether state enforcement programs
meet certain standards,' and leaves the EPA a residual enforcement
power under particular circumstances. 6 Exactly what these standards or circumstances shall be is not entirely ascertainable from
the 1978 Act. Should the standards be set too high, or the circumstances defined too broadly, state enforcement power will be diluted
beyond that intended by Congress.
Pub. L. No. 95-396, sec. 1-29, 92 Stat. 819 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976)) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Act].
2 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976) (amended 1978). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act as amended through 1975 will be referred to as FIFRA throughout this note. The
House Committee on Agriculture, in its report on H.R. 8681, a House bill later incorporated
into S. 1678, the bill enacted as the 1978 Act, explained that H.R. 8681 "facilitates the
effective implementation of [FIFRA] by adding the resources and inputs of. . . others with
special expertise and by improving coordination between EPA and other agencies .
H.R. REI. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977).
3 124 CONG. Rac. S15,304 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978)(remarks of Sen. Leahy, member of the
conference comm. on S. 1678).
1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, §§ 26-27 (redesignating §§ 26 & 27 of FIFRA as §§ 30 &
31, respectively, and inserting new §§ 26-29) (new § 26 & 27 to be codified as 7 U.S.C. §9
136w-1 & 136w-2, respectively).
Id. sec. 24, § 26 (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1).
Id. § 27 (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2).
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The legislative history of the 1978 Act is sufficiently clear, however, to prevent such possible misinterpretations. This note will
describe the relation of state and EPA regulatory authority prior to
1978, and will analyze the impact of specific pesticide use enforcement provisions of the 1978 Act on that relationship beginning with
the standards required of a state enforcement program. The scope
of the EPA's role in overseeing state compliance with these standards will be discussed, followed by an analysis of the breadth of
the enforcement power retained by the EPA under the 1978 Act.
Finally, this note will focus on the congressional policy considerations underlying the grant of primary enforcement responsibility to
the states, and indicate the extent to which these considerations
should further contract the EPA's enforcement role.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT

RESPONSIBILITY

Since 1947, FIFRA7 has been the basic federal pesticide statute.'
Initially, its scope was limited to the regulation of labeling of pesticides in interstate commerce.' In 1972, the original FIFRA was completely revised by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act
(FEPCA) 0 to provide comprehensive federal regulation of pesticides." Among the new provisions of FIFRA were sections making
7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976) (amended 1978).
The history of amendments to FIFRA is complex. FIFRA was first enacted in 1947, Pub.
L. No. 80-104, §§ 1-16, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as 7 U.S.C. § 135), but its provisions
were superseded in 1972 by those of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-516, §§ 1-27, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136). In 1975, further
amendments were made by Pub. L. No. 94-140, secs. 1-12, 89 Stat. 751 (1975). The 1975
amendments imposed additional procedural constraints on the decisionmaking process of the
EPA, W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 854 (1977), but did not affect either state or EPA
authority to enforce pesticide use regulations. For a general discussion of the effect of the 1975
amendments on other aspects of state and EPA authority to regulate the use and application
of pesticides, see Megysey, Government Authority to Regulate the Use and Application of
Pesticides: State vs. Federal, 21 S.D. L. REv. 652, 666 (1976).
1 See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, §§ 1-16, 61
Stat. 163 (1947) (superseded by FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976)). The enactment of 1947 was a
response to a need for regulation of a burgeoning pesticide industry. Butler, FederalPesticide
2

Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1233-34 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). The law

was designed to protect consumers from ineffective or unacceptably dangerous pesticide
products through the regulation of labeling. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 847 (1977).
IC
I

Pub. L. No. 92-516, §§ 1-27, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136).
For a discussion of the environmental concerns which led to the passage of FEPCA, see

W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 848-49 (1977); Butler, Federal Pesticide Law, in FEDERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1233-34 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Comment, The Federal
EnvironmentalPesticide Control Act of 1972: A Compromise Approach, 3 EcOLOGY L.Q. 277
(1973).
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certain conduct in the use of pesticides unlawful.2 Similar regulations regarding pesticide use already existed in a few states,' 3 and
following the passage of FEPCA, other states enacted pesticide use
laws." Generally, these state laws adopted standards similar to
those established by FIFRA. As a result, state pesticide use provisions are generally equivalent to or more stringent than the FIFRA

standards. 5
Unfortunately, neither the FIFRA nor its legislative history indicated how the states and the EPA were to apportion their authority
to enforce these pesticide use provisions. On the one hand, Congress
granted general authority to the EPA to "prescribe regulations to
carry out the provisions of [FIFRA],"'' arguably a grant broad
enough to allow the EPA to enforce pesticide use regulations within
a state. This proposition is supported to some extent by the EPA's
additional authority to assess civil penalties for violations of "any
provision" of FIFRA,' 7 and to inspect the records and establishments of any pesticide producer, seller or distributor. 8
On the other hand, FIFRA explicitly gave each state authority to
regulate the sale or designate the uses of a pesticide, provided the
regulation did not permit sale or uses prohibited by FIFRA. 9 While
not expressly giving enforcement authority to the states, this provision suggests that state enforcement of pesticide violations was not
meant to be completely preempted by the EPA."° An alternative
1 117 CONG. REc. 39975 (1971) (an explanation by Rep. Latta of H.R. 10729, the House
bill enacted as FEPCA). FEPCA made it unlawful for any person either to make available
for use, or to use any registered pesticide classified for restricted use for some or all purposes
unless the person using the pesticide is certified or working under the direct supervision of a
certihed applicator, or to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its
labeling. Pub. L. No. 92-516, §§ 3(d)(1)(C), 12(a)(2)(F)-(G), 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as
7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(d)(1)(C), 136j(a)(2)(F)-(G)).
,1See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, i§ 259, 261 (Smith-Hurd 1975) (effective July 1, 1969);
OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 2, § 3-176 (West, 1973) (effective May 23, 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
4-4-14 to -40 (1971).
11Fifty states had passed comprehensive pesticide use statutes by the end of 1975. OFFInE
OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DIGEST OF STATE PESTICIDE
USE AND APPLICATION LAWS

(1975).

,1123 CONG. REc. S13,096 (daily ed. July 29, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Allen, member of the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry); see 124 CONG. REc. H10,120 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wampler, member of the House Comm. on Agriculture).
" 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1978).
Id. § 1361(a)(1).
IS Id. §§ 136f-136g.
, Id. § 136v(a).
210FIFRA completely preempted state authority in some areas of pesticide regulation. E.g.,
7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1976) (regulation of intrastate distribution, sale and delivery of pesticides). See also 117 CONG. REc. 39976-77 (1971) (remarks by Rep. Poage).
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concept, that of cooperative enforcement, is also found in the language of FIFRA. 1 Such cooperation could include mutual division
of enforcement responsibility between a state and the EPA, and
would therefore leave at least some enforcement responsibility with
the state.
The legislative history of FIFRA gives no better indication as to
how enforcement responsibility should be divided. During the
FEPCA debate in the House of Representatives it was implied several times that the EPA was to carry out enforcement proceedings.2
Yet, during the same debate, the statement was made that states
were to be given "prime responsiblity for the certification and supervision of pesticide applicators," while the EPA was to set "the program standards the States must meet." State "supervision" implies enforcement of use violations; however, nothing said by the
House makes clear whether this was really intended to include enforcement functions.2 4 The Senate FEPCA debate on this issue is
similarly ambiguous.2 Thus, under FIFRA, the question of enforcement responsibility was left unsettled.
THE FEDERAL PESTICIDE

AcT OF 1978

When appropriations ended under FIFRA in 1977, Congress took
the opportunity offered by the appropriation hearings to amend
21 The EPA is required to cooperate with any appropriate agency of any state in carrying
out the provisions of FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136t(b) (1976) (amended 1978).
22 During the House debate on H.R. 10729, later enacted as FEPCA, Representative Latta
explained that the bill would "redirect [FIFRA's] thrust by providing for regulation through
the [EPA] of both the manufacture of pesticides and their use by individuals as well as
commercial applicators." 117 CONG. REC. 39975 (1971). Similarly, Representative Poage noted
that the House Committee on Agriculture, which had jurisdiction over H.R. 10729, believed
that the bill gave the EPA "authority . . .to enforce regulations which should prevent a
recurrence of . . .incidents where improper application of pesticides caused harm to the
ecology." Id. at 39976.
2 Id. at 39976-77 (remarks of Rep. Poage, member of the House Comm. on Agriculture).
24 The remarks of Senator Allen, made during the debate on S. 1678 (later enacted as the
1978 Act), support the contention that Congress intended FEPCA to include pesticide use
enforcement under state "supervision." He said that giving the states primary enforcement
responsibility under S. 1678 did "nothing more than to reiterate, in explicit statutory language, the intent of Congress in its enactment of [FEPCA]." He then described how the state
certification plans provided for effective state enforcement programs. 123 CONG. REc. S13,096
(daily ed. July 29, 1977).
For example, Senator Nelson stated that H.R. 10729, which was enacted as FEPCA,
sought "to modernize [FIFRA] and give the [EPA] the proper administrative tools to both
regulate the entry of new pesticides into the market and oversee the actual use and application of these pesticides." 118 CONG. REc. 32260 (1972). However, nothing in the Senate
FEPCA debate indicates how "oversee" might be defined.
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FIFRA again." These new amendments, the 1978 Act, 27 were signed
into law on October 30, 1978,2 so that FIFRA, as amended by the
1978 Act, constitutes the federal statutory framework of pesticide
regulation in force today.
Two sections of the 1978 Act explicitly allocate responsibility for
the regulation of pesticide use between the states and the EPA. The
first, section 26,29 sets forth the conditions under which a state will
have primary enforcement responsibility. The second, section 27,30
states the circumstances under which the EPA may exercise a residual enforcement power.
These two sections, which appear to give most of the enforcement
responsibility to the states, also limit that grant of authority by
allowing the EPA to decide whether a state has met the standards
for acquiring primary responsibility, and by giving the EPA residual
enforcement power under certain circumstances. Although the 1978
Act fails to delineatethese standards and circumstances, legislative
history provides explicit contours.
11The 1978 Act developed in Congress through both House and Senate committee initiatives. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry held hearings in June
1977 on the necessity of amending FIFRA. Extension of the FederalInsecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act: Hearings on S. 1678 Before the Subcomm. onAgriculturalResearch and
General Legislationof the Senate Comm. onAgriculture,Nutrition,andForestry, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977). S. 1678 was then drawn up and reported to the Senate. The bill provided
for extensive revision of FIFRA, but contained no language on primary responsibility for
enforcing pesticide use regulations. See S. REP. No. 334, 95TH CONG., 1ST Sass. 10-26 (1977).
Such a provision was subsequently added by the adoption of an amendment offered by
Senator Allen. 123 CONG. Rc. S13,096 (daily ed. July 29, 1977). S. 1678, as amended, was
then passed by the Senate. Id. at S13,103.
The House Committee on Agriculture held its own hearings in April and June 1977.
Extending and Amending FIFRA: Hearings on H.R. 8681 Before the Subcomm. on Department Investigations, Oversight, and Research of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The committee then reported H.R. 8681, which was a counterpart
to S. 1678 and included provisions vesting primary enforcement responsibility in the states.
H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1977). H.R. 8681 was incorporated into H.R.
7073, the House bill which extended funding under FIFRA. H.R. 7073 was then passed as
an amendment to S. 1678. 123 CONG. REc. H11,864 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1977).
A conference committee was then convened to consider the Senate and House versions of
S. 1678, and it reported back a compromise version on September 12, 1978. 124 CONG. REC.
H9,529 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1978). The report suggested incorporation of most of the House
language on primary enforcement responsibility. Id. at H9,539-40. The Senate agreed to the
compromise version of S. 1678 on September 18, 1978, id. at S15,303 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978),
as did the House on the following day, id. at H10,117 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978).
" 1978 Act, supra note 1.
2 Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 14 WEEKLy Comp. OF PREs. Doc. 1696 (Oct. 2, 1978).
" 1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 26 (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1) (inserting new
§ 26, and redesignating old § 26 of FIFRA as § 30).
" Id. sec. 24, § 27 (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2) (inserting new § 27, and redesignating old § 27 of FIFRA as § 31).
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Section 26: State Primary Enforcement Responsibility
Transfer of Primary Enforcement Responsibility
Under section 26(b), 31 all states entering into a "cooperative
agreement" for the enforcement of pesticide use restrictions under
section 23 of FIFRA, as amended by the 1978 Act, 3 shall have primary enforcement responsibility. Responsibility, according to Senator Leahy, is transferred "automatically" to states participating in
cooperative enforcement arrangements.3
States which do not enter into a cooperative agreement must have
their program approved by the EPA before they may exercise primary enforcement responsibility. Approval, as governed by section
26(a) ,3 is contingent on EPA determination that a state has ade31 Section 26(b) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any State
that enters into a cooperative agreement with the Administrator under section
23 of this Act for the enforcement of pesticide use restrictions shall have the
primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations. Any State that
has a plan approved by the Administrator in accordance with the requirements
of section 4 of this Act that the Administrator determines meets the criteria set
out in subsection (a) of this section shall have the primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations. The Administrator shall make such determinations with respect to State plans under section 4 of this Act in effect on the
date of enactment of the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978 not later than six months
after that date.
1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 26(b) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-l(b)).
32 Under § 23(a)(1) of FIFRA, the EPA is authorized to enter into cooperative enforcement
agreements with the states "to delegate to any State . . . the authority to cooperate in the
enforcement of the [provisions of FIFRA] through the use of [the state's] personnel or
facilities." FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1978). Cooperative agreements
detail the actions to be taken by the state in its enforcement role. 123 CONG. REc. S13,096
(daily ed. July 29, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Leahy, member of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry).
For examples of state enforcement provisions under cooperative agreements, see IND. COD
§ 15-3-3.6-14 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 217B.120 (Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-25-5.B
(Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111.53 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
124 CONG. REc. S15,304 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978) (Sen. Leahy, introducing and explaining the conference comm. report on S. 1678). Thirty-six states (including the District of
Columbia and Guam) have participated in such arrangements as of January 1979. 44.Fed.
Reg. 4352, 4359 (1979).
Section 26(a) states:
For the purposes of this Act, a State shall have primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations during any period for which the Administrator
determines that such State (1) has adopted adequate pesticide use laws and regulations; Provided,That
the Administrator may not require a State to have pesticide use laws that are
more stringent than this Act;
(2) has adopted and is implementing adequate procedures for the enforce-
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quate pesticide use laws and regulations, has adopted and is implementing adequate enforcement procedures, and will keep records
and make reports to the EPA showing compliance with such laws,
regulations and procedures.
The 1978 Act gives no clear indication of how strict these standards must be. Although section 26(a) prohibits the EPA from reqtiiring more stringent state pesticide laws and regulations than
those in FIFRA, as amended by the 1978 Act, the language of the
new Act nowhere specifies whether or to what extent lesser state

standards would be adequate to obtain EPA approval.
Legislative history does shed light on the standards intended by
Congress. Senator Allen, during debate on the 1978 Act, proposed
that a state be granted primary enforcement responsibility if its
current enforcement plan is approved by the EPA as part of the
state certification plan under section 4 of FIFRA.3 5 Since state certification plans are meant to regulate only the qualifications of applicators, their enforcement procedures are not necessarily as comprehensive"6 as those under cooperative enforcement agreements, which
subject "any person" to the Act."7 Nonetheless, in practice the scope
of enforcement provided by cooperative agreements and under state
certification plans may be equivalent. 8
ment of such State laws and regulations; and
(3) will keep such records and make such reports showing compliance with
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection as the Administrator may require by
regulation.
1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 26(a) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-l(a)).
2 123 CONG. REc. S13,096 (daily ed. July 29, 1977). As of January 1979, 14 states had
approved certification plans under § 4 of FIFRA. 44 Fed. Reg. 4352, 4360 (1979). Section 4
provides that "[i]f any State . . .desires to certify applicators of pesticides, the Governor
of such State shall submit a State plan for such purpose. The [EPA] shall approve the plan
. ..if such plan in [its] judgment [meets certain specific requirements]." FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136b (1976). Enforcement provisions are considered a necessary element of an approvable
state certification plan under EPA policy, 40 Fed. Reg. 11698, 11699 (1975), although the
primary purpose of state certification plans under § 4 is to allow states to determine which
individuals are qualified to use and supervise the use of restricted-use pesticides. 40 C.F.R.
§ 171.1 (1978).
11To obtain approval of its certification plan, a state must have, at a minimum, provisions
making it unlawful for persbns other than certified applicators, or persons working under their
direct supervision, to use restricted-use pesticides, as well as provisions for right-of-entry, and
record keeping by certified applicators. 40 C.F.R. § 171.7(b)(1)(iii)(C)-(E) (1978). Also, a
state has to provide for "denying, suspending, and revoking certification of applicators, and
assessing criminal and/or civil penalties . . [for the] misuse of a pesticide and falsification
of [required records]." Id. § 171.7(b)(1)(ii i)(A)-(B).
1 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2) (1976).
3aThis is mainly because concern over pesticide misuse is directed principally at restricteduse pesticides, as their potential for harm is much greater than that of general-use pesticides.
See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1) (1976) (basis upon which a pesticide is to be classified).
Since state certification plans control the use of all pesticides by certified applicators, and
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Even so, Congress apparently felt that certification plans might
not provide enforcement standards high enough to justify a grant of
primary enforcement responsibility. Instead of following Senator
Allen's proposal, Congress granted automatic primary enforcement
responsibility only to those states participating in cooperative enforcement agreements.3 9 States having only section 4 certification
plans are required, under section 26(b), to obtain approval from the
EPA under section 26(a) before they will be granted primary enforcement responsibility. Therefore, by implication, Congress seems
to have intended the EPA to require the standards relating to cooperative enforcement agreements in evaluating state enforcement
plans under section 26(a).4°

However, even applying cooperative agreement standards, the
EPA should be able to approve primary responsibility for most
states with certification plans since most states have existing enforcement plans meeting those standards.' For the states failing to
meet these standards initially, approval should not be difficult to
obtain since their enforcement programs would be deemed deficient
merely because they only regulate users of restricted-use pesticides.
Since these states already possess a regulatory framework under
their certification plans, the scope of their regulation could be
broadened without major legislative revision or change in regulatory
philosophy."
allow only certified applicators to use restricted-use pesticides, the only additional control
that cooperative agreements provide is over uncertified users of general-use pesticides. However, a misuse of a general-use pesticide by an uncertified user seldom has serious consequences and therefore rarely comes to the attention of enforcement officials. In addition,
unless the user is certified, he will not be subject to routine scrutiny by enforcement officials.
Thus, although enforcement under cooperative agreements applies to "any person," 7 U.S.C.
§ 136j(a)(2) (1976), in practice the actual control may not be much greater than that provided
by state certification plans.
11 1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 26(b) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-l(b)).
0 Senator Leahy, during debate on S. 1678, commented on Senator Allen's amendment to
give primary enforcement responsibility to the states, saying that
[the]EPA and several States have already concluded cooperative enforcement
agreements which spell out in detail the actions that will be taken by States in
their primary enforcement role. This amendment should add impetus to these
efforts. Some States will need to modify [approved certification] plans if they
are limited to certified applicators and restricted use pesticides in order to
embrace the wider scope of use enforcement for which they will be responsible
under this provision.
123 CONG. Rac. S13,096 (daily ed. July 29, 1977).
", See id. (remarks of Sen. Allen); cf. H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977)
(House Comm. on Agriculture discussion implying that the EPA would retain primary enforcement responsibility only in exceptional cases).
4 In fact, the requirement that the EPA complete state evaluations under § 26(a) within
six months, 1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 26(b), suggests that Congress did not expect
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As to the seven states with neither a cooperative agreement nor
an approved certification plan, the EPA has proposed that primary
enforcement responsibility not be conferred until "such time as the
state's [certification] plan is given full approval by EPA and its
enforcement authorities have been reviewed for adequacy, or the
state applies for review of its enforcement authorities and EPA finds
they are consistent with . . . § 26(a)."1
The EPA's Oversight Role
Under section 26(a)(3),11 the EPA retains oversight functions even
in states which have primary enforcement responsibility, but only
to the extent of reviewing state records or reports concerning compli5
ance with state pesticide use laws and enforcement procedures.
The reporting requirements which the 1978 Act allows the EPA
to impose on the states should not be too burdensome if the EPA
follows the same procedures already established for certification
plans." For certification plans, the EPA feels that it is "necessary
to have information concerning a broad range of enforcement activities," 7 but has assured the states that requests for information "will
be employed judiciously, and that requests . . . will be made with
sufficient lead time."4 This limited exercise of review power should
enable the EPA to monitor state compliance with enforcement responsibilities without substantially impinging on state exercise of
that responsibility.
the states to have much difficulty in obtaining approval for primary enforcement responsibility.
43 44 Fed. Reg. 4352, 4360 (1979).
" 1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 26(a)(3) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1(a)(3)).
For the text of this section, see note 34 supra.
45The legislative history indicates that originally the EPA was to have an even broader
power of on site investigation of state enforcement. For example, Senator Leahy, a member
of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, stated during debate on the
1978 Act that the EPA "will. . . have ample opportunity to monitor the performance of the
States in the area of pesticide use enforcement, including opportunity to conduct its own
inspections for verification that the State program fulfills the objective of the Federal law."
123 CONG. REC. S13,096 (daily ed. July 29, 1977).

However, after this statement, the narrower language in § 26(a)(3) was incorporated into
the 1978 Act. This change seemingly rejects Senator Leahy's idea that the EPA could send
its own investigators into a state to monitor that state's performance. The narrow language
is also in line with congressional "faith" in the adequacy of state enforcement programs, see,
e.g., id. (remarks of Sen. Allen), and with congressional desire to eliminate duplication of
effort, see, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S15,304 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
" For the record and report requirements imposed on states under certification plans, see
40 C.F.R. § 171.7(d) (1978).
'1 40 Fed. Reg. 11698, 11701 (1975).
,8 Id.
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Section 27: Residual Enforcement Powers of the EPA
Failure of the State to Take Adequate Action on a Referred
Complaint
Under section 27(a), the EPA must refer "any complaint or other
information alleging or indicating a significant violation of the pesticide use provisions of [FIFRA]" to a state having primary enforcement responsibility. 9 The 1978 Act does not define "significant
violation," 5 but its legislative history is, again, helpful.
This provision, as originally proposed in the House, required the
EPA to refer to the state "any complaint alleging a violation." 5' The
languiage was subsequently narrowed during conference committee
consideration of the 1978 Act by insertion of the word "significant"
to modify "violation,"" indicating that Congress intended the EPA
to winnow out reports of trivial violations. Furthermore, the primary
enforcement responsibility of the states would be negated if the EPA
could compel the states to investigate any complaint, for such a
course would severely restrict a state's prosecutorial discretion, a
normal attribute of enforcement responsibility. 3
The EPA may intervene and act on a complaint referred to a state
under section 27(a) whenever a state has not "commenced appropriate enforcement action"' 4 within thirty days of referral. What constitutes "appropriate enforcement action" is not yet clear." HowSection 27(a) states:
Upon receipt of any complaint or other information alleging or indicating a
significant violation of the pesticide use provisions of this Act, the Administrator shall refer the matter to the appropriate State officials for their investigation
of the matter consistent with the requirements of this Act. If, within thirty days,
the State has not commenced appropriate enforcement action, the Administrator may act upon the complaint or information to the extent authorized under
this Act.
1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 27(a) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2(a)).
10 The EPA proposes to define "significant violation of the pesticide use provisions" by
early 1980. 44 Fed. Reg. 4352, 4360 (1979).
' H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977).
See H.R. REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978).
Professor Davis notes that under the present American legal system, prosecutorial power
may be exercised by the police, regulatory agencies, licensing agencies and other agencies and
officers, and that it is universally assumed that this power must be discretionary. K. DAvis,
ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 110 (3d ed. 1972).
11The conference committee on S. 1678 stated that under § 26(a) the EPA could enforce
FIFRA "in the absence of action by the State within 30 days." H.R. REP. No. 1560, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978).
51 The EPA proposes to define "appropriate enforcement action" by early 1980. 44 Fed.
Reg. 4352, 4360 (1979).
"
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ever, it would seem that the EPA could require no more than that
the state follow its normal procedure for acting on that type of use
violation.
Failure or Inability of the State to Carry Out Adequate Enforcement
Under section 27(b),56 the EPA has authority to rescind all or part
of a state's primary enforcement responsibility if it determines that
the state will not, or cannot, discharge that responsibility. Neither
the 1978 Act nor Congress has elaborated on what would constitute
an inadequate performance of responsibility."
Before the EPA can rescind state enforcement responsibility, section 27(b) requires that it notify the state of its program's inadequacies, and then afford the state ninety days to correct them; if the
inadequacies go uncorrected, rescission may follow. 58 The EPA will

soon propose regulations which will "outline procedures for rescinding primary use enforcement responsibility."5 The proposed regulations will probably include hearing provisions, since current regulations governing certification plans provide for a hearing at the request of the state."
Following rescission, it is unclear what a state must show in order
to regain primary enforcement responsibility. Because Congress intends that states should exercise enforcement responsibility whenever possible," a state seemingly would have to evidence clearly
either a chronic inability to carry out its responsibilities or bad faith
before the EPA could demand special assurances or impose more
rigorous enforcement program standards.
Section 27(b) states:
Whenever the Administrator determines that a State having primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations is not carrying out (or cannot
carry out due to the lack of adequate legal authority) such responsibility, the
Administrator shall notify the State. Such notice shall specify those aspects of
the administration of the State program that are determined to be inadequate.
The State shall have ninety days after receipt of the notice to correct any
deficiencies. If after that time the Administrator determines that the State
program remains inadequate, the Administrator may rescind, in whole or in
part, the State's primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations.
1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 27(b) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2(b)).
11See H.R. REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978); 124 CONG. Rc.H10,117-18 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Foley); id. at S15,304 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978) (remarks
of Sen. Leahy).
" For the text of § 27(b), see note 56 supra.
, 44 Fed. Reg. 4352, 4360 (1979).
, 40 Fed. Reg. 11698, 11701 (1975).
, See H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977).
"
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If exercised discreetly, the EPA's power to rescind only part of a
state's enforcement responsibility could benefit both the EPA and
the state. Since it would allow the EPA to take over only the deficient portion of a state program, this power would reduce federal
cost for interim enforcement and would provide the state time to
correct the deficiency while leaving the rest of its regulatory program intact.
Emergency Enforcement Powers of the EPA
Under section 27(c),62 the EPA may also exercise residual enforcement powers when it determines that "emergency conditions exist
that require immediate action on the part of the [EPA] and the
State authority is unwilling or unable adequately to respond to the
emergency."6 3
The language of the Senate provision on emergency enforcement
authority originally gave the EPA broader powers: "Nothing herein
shall limit the authoity of the [EPA] to enforce this Act, where
[it] determines that conditions exist which require action by the
[EPA]."' The language that the House adopted was more limiting,
as it provided that the EPA must determine that emergency conditions exist which require immediate action." It was this narrower
House provision, along with a further limitation that "the State
authority [must be] unwilling or unable adequately to respond to
the emergency," that was finally incorporated into FIFRA by the
1978 Act." The latter provision also limits the EPA by forcing the
agency to evaluate the adequacy of the state's response or ability to
respond before any EPA action may be taken.
The EPA's residual emergency power has been further limited by
a narrow interpretation of "emergency." The House Committee on
Agriculture, in presenting its version of the 1978 Act, reported that
"emergency" applied to situations where the EPA felt that "an
Section 27(c) states:
Neither section 26 of this Act nor this section shall limit the authority of the
Administrator to enforce this Act, where the Administrator determines that
emergency conditions exist that require immediate action on the part of the
Administrator and the State authority is unwilling or unable adequately to
respond to the emergency.
1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 24, § 27(c) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2(c)).
"

!d.
I3

, 123 CONG. REc. S13,101 (daily ed. July 29, 1977).
6 H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
" H.R. REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978).
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immediate intervention is required for public health purposes.""7
This choice of the "public health" terminology" should rule out
EPA intervention in emergencies which threaten the "environment"
without posing a direct threat to public health.
Policy ConsiderationsBehind the Grant of Primary Enforcement
Responsibility to the States
Behind the specific language and legislative history of sections 26
and 27, stands a clear congressional preference for state enforcement
programs. This attitude seems to stem from congressional concern
that EPA enforcement activity prior to the 1978 Act did not respond
to congressional intent69 or local needs." Additionally, Congress expressed concern that the EPA's expenditure of funds and energy on
enforcement was a misuse of resources, since state enforcement was
adequate and the EPA had fallen far behind in many of its other
responsibilities. 71 The congressional response to these concerns, as
captured in the legislative history, clearly indicates that Congress

intended the EPA to exercise only a minimal role in pesticide use
enforcement.
During consideration of the 1978 Act, Congress indicated that the
H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1977).
The apparent limitation of emergencies to "public health" threats under § 27(c) leaves
a gap in the EPA's residual enforcement powers since neither § 27(a) nor § 27(b) enables the
EPA to respond quickly to an emergency threatening the environment.Previous debate on the
definition of "emergency conditions" suggests that the congressional choice of language in the
1978 Act was intentional. At issue in the 1975 debate was the type of emergency conditions
which would allow the EPA to waive its duty to notify the Secretary of Agriculture about
proposed pesticide control actions. The House had limited the conditions to those of
"imminent hazard to human health." 121 CoNG. REc. 31595, 32514 (1975). The Senate,
however, extended the definition to situations where imminent hazards exist to endangered
species of wild life, rare ecosystems, or important fish or game resources. Id. at 36115-16. But
this Senate language was subsequently found to be "much too broad" by the House conferees,
who adopted the House language instead. Id. at 37442.
The EPA proposes to promulgate regulations defining "emergency conditions" by early
1980. 44 Fed. Reg. 4352, 4360 (1979).
'1 See H.R. RF. No. 343, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (discussion of issues identified
during hearings regarding the need for amendment of FIFRA); 123 CONG. REC. S13,092-93
(daily ed. July 29, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
10E.g., H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977); 124 CONG. Rc.H11,864 (daily
ed. Oct. 31, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Fithian, member of the House Comm. on Agriculture,
and sponsor of H.R. 8681).
71Senator Leahy, in his introduction and explanation of the conference committee report
on S.1678 said, "[t]his State enforcement program will reduce duplication of effort and
permit EPA to concentrate its resources on higher priority matters." 124 CONG. Rc.S15,304
(daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978). For similar comments in the House debate, see the remarks of
Representative Fithian. 123 CONG. REc. H11,864 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1977).
'
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EPA's narrow reading of certain pesticide use provisions in FIFRA
failed to respond to the congressional intent underlying those measures. In one case, the EPA was interpreting "use inconsistent with
the label"72 to include any deviation from the label instructions.
Congress criticized this interpretation as working too severe a hardship on pesticide users,73 and as not exhibiting a common-sense
approach.74 The states were not similarly criticized; in fact, several
state enforcement officials joined in the criticism of the EPA.75 To
clarify the issue, the 1978 Act amended the definitions of "use inconsistent with the label" to permit certain deviations."
Related to the concern that the EPA was interpreting pesticide
use provisions too stringently was a congressional concern that the
EPA was not cognizant of local needs. Representative Fithian, during the House debate on the 1978 Act, noted with approval that now
"[local farmers, farm organizations, and community and business
leaders will be able to work directly with the State and local pesticide enforcement officers, thus assuring the establishment of adequate efficacy procedures and enforcement regulations."7 Representative Wampler similarly stated, "I favor getting as much authority as we reasonably can to those local government entities...
that are closest to the problems."" These statements imply that the
EPA is inherently less able than the states to meet local needs.
The tenor of the legislative history indicates that the strongest
influence behind congressional preference for state enforcement programs was a desire to impart greater efficiency into the regulatory
n The provision of FIFRA which makes it unlawful for any person to "use any registered
pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling," 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (1976), is an
important means of regulating pesticide use since federal regulations require the pesticide
label to detail explicitly any limitations on the use of the pesticide. 40 C.F.R. § 162.10 (1978).
This allows the enforcement agency to avoid the difficult task of demonstrating that a pesticide was used in an unlawful manner. However, the limitation of uses to those described on
the label has also created a problem by reducing the flexibility of pesticide use.
" Senator Leahy commented during debate on S. 1678 that under current EPA standards
"[u]ses that do not comply with the label are determined to be illegal," and "this stricter
interpretation has caused a significant hardship to many applicators and users of pesticides. . . . In response to this problem the committee has adopted four changes in the
definition of 'use inconsistent with the label."' 123 CONG. REc. S13,091 (daily ed. July 29,
1977).
7'The EPA's failure to take a common-sense approach was recognized as early as 1975.
H.R. REP. No. 497, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975).
11FederalInsecticide,Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: Hearings on the General Farm Bill
Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, pt. 3, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 256-57 (1977) (testimony
of W. Buffaloe, Pres., Amer. Assoc. of Pesticide Control Officials).
' 1978 Act, supra note 1, sec. 1(7) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 136c).
123 CONG. REc. H11,864 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1977).
78 124 CONG. REc. H10,120 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978).
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process.7" The prevailing sentiment during the congressional debate
of the 1978 Act was" that state enforcement of pesticide use was
generally adequate, if not better than EPA enforcement and, therefore, the EPA efforts were unnecessary duplication. Representative
Wampler stated that "State agencies have proved to be quite effective in dealing with matters relating to pesticides and other chemicals. In many circumstances, States have taken initiatives that the
EPA could well emulate.""0 Senator Allen pointed out that "[t]he
majority of States today already have adopted [plans for the use of
pesticides by certified applicators] . . . In many cases these plans
provide for more restrictive regulation of pesticide use than required
by the Federal standards established under FIFRA." 1
Regarding the duplication of enforcement efforts, Senator Allen
explained that giving the states primary enforcement responsibility
"would allow the States to carry out their approved plans on the one
hand and leave EPA to carry out its own responsibilities under
FIFRA with respect to those matters more appropriately left 'to
central Federal administrations. ' 82 The report of the House Committee on Agriculture makes it particularly clear that one of its
3
purposes was to eliminate such duplication of effort.1
The Prospective Effect of Sections 26 and 27
It might be argued that placing major reliance on the states for
enforcement of pesticide use violations would dilute the FIFRA enforcement standards. Such a conclusion is plausible only if the
states are assumed to be less concerned with environmental protection, 4 or more susceptible to agriculture or pesticide industry lobby5
ing for relaxed enforcement standards, than the EPA.1
7,For example, in explaining the conference committee report on S. 1678, Senator Talmadge said, "the committee's primary concern. . . was to find a way to make FIFRA work
effectively." Id. at S15,306-07 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1978).
"Id. at H10,120 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1978). See also 123 CONG. REc. S13,092 (daily ed. July
29, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
11 123 CONG. REc. S13,096 (daily ed. July 29, 1977).
92 Id.

9 The House Committee on Agriculture reported that the 1978 Act would facilitate the
effective implementation of FIFRA by "improving coordination between EPA and other
agencies carrying out similar activities so as to eliminate duplication of effort." H.R. REP.
No. 663, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977). See also 123 CONG. REc. H11,864 (daily ed. Oct. 31,
1977) (remarks of Rep. Fithian).
" For example, Butler argues that states provide less uniform and environmentally con-

scious pesticide regulation. Butler, FederalPesticide Law, in
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1245, 1272-73 (. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
" It has even been argued that state agencies may lessen the level of regulation out of fear
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That conclusion, however, seems unwarranted."5 Even conceding
for the sake of argument that state bias will obtain in some instances, it is difficult to visualize how giving the states primary enforcement responsibility might significantly diminish current standards
of pesticide use enforcement. First, the greater efficiency of state
enforcement should counterbalance the specter of state bias. 7 Second, sections 26 and 27 establish sufficient mechanisms for insulating current enforcement standards from state bias. Section 26 limits
the grant of primary enforcement responsibility to states matching
the current standards of the cooperative agreements. Sections 26
and 27 also preserve the integrity of those standards by allowing the
EPA to review state enforcement activity and to preempt state authority when necessary to insure adequate enforcement.89 Finally,
section 27 provides for EPA enforcement of those use violations that
a state cannot, or will not, enforce. °
Accordingly, sections 26 and 27 are designed to facilitate enforcement as originally intended under FIFRA rather than to lower enforcement standards. Any other interpretation of sections 26 and 27
would frustrate Congress' policy of granting primary enforcement
responsibility to the states.
CONCLUSION

The 1978 Act expressly gives primary enforcement responsibility
for pesticide use violations to states meeting certain standards. This
allocation reflects a clear congressional preference, in this area of
pesticide regulation, for granting enforcement responsibility to the
states, and not the EPA. Congress provides the EPA with means for
ensuring that the state programs are adequate. It also gives the EPA
some residual enforcement power, although the 1978 Act and its
legislative history indicate that this remaining EPA authority is
intended to be narrow in scope, and is to interfere with state enforceof a legislative backlash favoring even less environmental regulation. Note, IndianaEnvironmental ProtectionAgencies: A Survey & Critique, 10 IND. L. REv. 976 (1977).
11One commentator felt that "the prognosis for effective enforcement on the state level is

more encouraging [than that at the federal level], as state officials may be expected to be
more cognizant of local pesticide use, personnel and potentially dangerous conditions." Comment, The FederalEnvironmental ControlAct of 1972: A CompromiseApproach, 3 EcOLOY
L.Q. 303 n.137 (1973).
" For a discussion of the congressional concern for efficiency, see notes 82-83 & accompanying text supra.
" See notes 37-45 & accompanying text supra.
" See notes 47-50, 61 & accompanying text supra.
,0 See notes 54-59, 65-68 & accompanying text supra.
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ment programs only to ensure the continuance of adequate enforcement. Under FIFRA, as amended by the 1978 Act, most states will
be granted essentially exclusive responsibility for enforcing pesticide use violations, without sacrifice of the current enforcement
standards.
RicHARD B. SCHOENBOHM

